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A Brief History of Pakistan's Nuclear Program
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was established in 1972 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who founded the program while he was Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources, and later became President and Prime Minister. Shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 1971 war with India, Bhutto initiated the program with a meeting of physicists and engineers at Multan in January 1972.
India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.
In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.
Nuclear Tests
On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.
On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation.
Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras Koh range. The single test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal
1 announced 2 estimated
DEVICE DATE YIELD[1] YIELD[2]
[boosted device?] 28 May 1998 25-36 kiloton total 9-12 kiloton
Fission device 28 May 1998 12 kiloton total 9-12 kiloton
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Fission device 30 May 1998 12 kiloton 4-6 kiloton
Fission device not detonated 12 kiloton --
(This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as the announced yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons.)
According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding.
These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India.
Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan's incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over.
Nuclear Infrastructure
Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A. Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.
In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was operational. According to public statements made by US officials, this unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile.
Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to Pakistan's Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are subject to IAEA inspection.
Nuclear Arsenal
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons.
Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form" and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly." However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their nuclear weapons security.
Pakistan's reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to diversion. HEU can be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within the means of non-state actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.
The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan's military began relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of nuclear materials and expertise. In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.
Foreign Assistance
In the past, China played a major role in the development of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and technology elsewhere. According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has provided critical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan's production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation also contributed to Pakistan's efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate the high-speed rotation of centrifuges.
According to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is also reported to have provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, which is relatively sophisticated in design and lighter than U.S. and Soviet designed first generation warheads.
China also provided technical and material support in the completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. The project had been initiated as a cooperative program with France, but Pakistan's failure to sign the NPT and unwillingness to accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program caused France to terminate assistance.
According to the Defense Department report cited above, Pakistan has also acquired nuclear related and dual-use and equipment and materials from the Former Soviet Union and Western Europe.
Intermittent US Sanctions
On several occasions, under the authority of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. has imposed sanctions on Pakistan, cutting off economic and military aid as a result of its pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. suspended sanctions each time developments in Afghanistan made Pakistan a strategically important "frontline state," such as the 1981 Soviet occupation and in the war on terrorism.
Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine
Several sources, such as Jane's Intelligence Review and Defense Department reports maintain that Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons program is to counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India, which has superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons.
Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the Defense Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision."
Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, as evidenced by President Pervez Musharraf's statements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not want a conflict with India but that if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals, he would "respond with full might." These statements were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons.
Source: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/
India's 1974 testing of a nuclear "device" gave Pakistan's nuclear program new momentum. Through the late 1970s, Pakistan's program acquired sensitive uranium enrichment technology and expertise. The 1975 arrival of Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan considerably advanced these efforts. Dr. Khan is a German-trained metallurgist who brought with him knowledge of gas centrifuge technologies that he had acquired through his position at the classified URENCO uranium enrichment plant in the Netherlands. Dr. Khan also reportedly brought with him stolen uranium enrichment technologies from Europe. He was put in charge of building, equipping and operating Pakistan's Kahuta facility, which was established in 1976. Under Khan's direction, Pakistan employed an extensive clandestine network in order to obtain the necessary materials and technology for its developing uranium enrichment capabilities.
In 1985, Pakistan crossed the threshold of weapons-grade uranium production, and by 1986 it is thought to have produced enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan continued advancing its uranium enrichment program, and according to Pakistani sources, the nation acquired the ability to carry out a nuclear explosion in 1987.
Nuclear Tests
On May 28, 1998 Pakistan announced that it had successfully conducted five nuclear tests. The Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission reported that the five nuclear tests conducted on May 28 generated a seismic signal of 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a total yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT). Dr. A.Q. Khan claimed that one device was a boosted fission device and that the other four were sub-kiloton nuclear devices.
On May 30, 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warhead with a reported yield of 12 kilotons. The tests were conducted at Balochistan, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six. It has also been claimed by Pakistani sources that at least one additional device, initially planned for detonation on 30 May 1998, remained emplaced underground ready for detonation.
Pakistani claims concerning the number and yields of their underground tests cannot be independently confirmed by seismic means, and several sources, such as the Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. Indian sources have also suggested that as few as two weapons were actually detonated, each with yields considerably lower than claimed by Pakistan. However, seismic data showed at least two and possibly a third, much smaller, test in the initial round of tests at the Ras Koh range. The single test on 30 May provided a clear seismic signal
1 announced 2 estimated
DEVICE DATE YIELD[1] YIELD[2]
[boosted device?] 28 May 1998 25-36 kiloton total 9-12 kiloton
Fission device 28 May 1998 12 kiloton total 9-12 kiloton
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Low-yield device 28 May 1998 sub-kiloton --
Fission device 30 May 1998 12 kiloton 4-6 kiloton
Fission device not detonated 12 kiloton --
(This table lists the nuclear tests that Pakistan claims to have carried out in May 1998 as well as the announced yields. Other sources have reported lower yields than those claimed by Pakistan. The Southern Arizona Seismic Observatory reports that the total seismic yield for the May 28th tests was 9-12 kilotons and that the yield for the May 30th tests was 4-6 kilotons.)
According to a preliminary analysis conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory, material released into the atmosphere during an underground nuclear test by Pakistan in May 1998 contained low levels of weapons-grade plutonium. The significance of the Los Alamos finding was that Pakistan had either imported or produced plutonium undetected by the US intelligence community. But Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and other agencies later contested the accuracy of this finding.
These tests came slightly more than two weeks after India carried out five nuclear tests of its own on May 11 and 13 and after many warnings by Pakistani officials that they would respond to India.
Pakistan's nuclear tests were followed by the February 1999 Lahore Agreements between Prime Ministers Vajpayee and Sharif. The agreements included confidence building measures such as advance notice of ballistic missile testing and a continuation of their unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing. But diplomatic advances made that year were undermined by Pakistan's incursion into Kargil. Under US diplomatic pressure, Prime Minister Sharif withdrew his troops, but lost power in October 1999 due to a military coup in which Gen. Pervez Musharraf took over.
Nuclear Infrastructure
Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A. Q. Khan research laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facility. The Kahuta facility has been in operation since the early 1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit of expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.
In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt (megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was operational. According to public statements made by US officials, this unsafeguarded heavy water reactor generates an estimated 8-10 kilotons of weapons grade plutonium per year, which is enough for one to two nuclear weapons. The reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6. According to J. Cirincione of Carnegie, Khusab's plutonium production capacity could allow Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that would be easier to deliver with a ballistic missile.
Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs reprocessing plant next to Pakistan's Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the larger Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are subject to IAEA inspection.
Nuclear Arsenal
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU-based nuclear warheads, and Carnegie reports that they have produced 585-800 kg of HEU, enough for 30-55 weapons. Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design that uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires an estimated 15-20 kg of material per warhead. According to Carnegie, Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown quantity of weapons grade plutonium, which is sufficient for an estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons.
Pakistani authorities claim that their nuclear weapons are not assembled. They maintain that the fissile cores are stored separately from the non-nuclear explosives packages, and that the warheads are stored separately from the delivery systems. In a 2001 report, the Defense Department contends that "Islamabad's nuclear weapons are probably stored in component form" and that "Pakistan probably could assemble the weapons fairly quickly." However, no one has been able to ascertain the validity of Pakistan's assurances about their nuclear weapons security.
Pakistan's reliance primarily on HEU makes its fissile materials particularly vulnerable to diversion. HEU can be used in a relatively simple gun-barrel-type design, which could be within the means of non-state actors that intend to assemble a crude nuclear weapon.
The terrorist attacks on September 11th raised concerns about the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. According to press reports, within two days of the attacks, Pakistan's military began relocating nuclear weapons components to six new secret locations. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Pervez Musharraf fired his intelligence chief and other officers and detained several suspected retired nuclear weapons scientists, in an attempt to root out extremist elements that posed a potential threat to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.
Concerns have also been raised about Pakistan as a proliferant of nuclear materials and expertise. In November, 2002, shortly after North Korea admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program, the press reported allegations that Pakistan had provided assistance in the development of its uranium enrichment program in exchange for North Korean missile technologies.
Foreign Assistance
In the past, China played a major role in the development of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire materials and technology elsewhere. According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear materials and expertise and has provided critical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
In the 1990s, China designed and supplied the heavy water Khusab reactor, which plays a key role in Pakistan's production of plutonium. A subsidiary of the China National Nuclear Corporation also contributed to Pakistan's efforts to expand its uranium enrichment capabilities by providing 5,000 custom made ring magnets, which are a key component of the bearings that facilitate the high-speed rotation of centrifuges.
According to Anthony Cordesman of CSIS, China is also reported to have provided Pakistan with the design of one of its warheads, which is relatively sophisticated in design and lighter than U.S. and Soviet designed first generation warheads.
China also provided technical and material support in the completion of the Chasma nuclear power reactor and plutonium reprocessing facility, which was built in the mid 1990s. The project had been initiated as a cooperative program with France, but Pakistan's failure to sign the NPT and unwillingness to accept IAEA safeguards on its entire nuclear program caused France to terminate assistance.
According to the Defense Department report cited above, Pakistan has also acquired nuclear related and dual-use and equipment and materials from the Former Soviet Union and Western Europe.
Intermittent US Sanctions
On several occasions, under the authority of amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act, the U.S. has imposed sanctions on Pakistan, cutting off economic and military aid as a result of its pursuit of nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. suspended sanctions each time developments in Afghanistan made Pakistan a strategically important "frontline state," such as the 1981 Soviet occupation and in the war on terrorism.
Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine
Several sources, such as Jane's Intelligence Review and Defense Department reports maintain that Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons program is to counter the threat posed by its principal rival, India, which has superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons.
Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). According to the Defense Department report cited above, "Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only after India joined the Treaty. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani officials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have disavowed any connection with India's decision."
Pakistan does not abide by a no-first-use doctrine, as evidenced by President Pervez Musharraf's statements in May, 2002. Musharraf said that Pakistan did not want a conflict with India but that if it came to war between the nuclear-armed rivals, he would "respond with full might." These statements were interpreted to mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack from India, which has superior conventional forces, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons.
Source: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/
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Wednesday, October 21, 2009
Sunday, October 11, 2009
In The Line Of Fire (Pervez Musharraf)
Book Review:
![]()
Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military president, is a contradictory figure: a dictator convinced that he's the best hope for democracy, a moderate Muslim reluctant to confront fundamentalists, a powerful man who exudes confident aplomb but suffers from lifelong insecurity as a migrant in his own land.
In the Line of Fire, Musharraf's English-language memoir, is an equally contradictory effort to explain himself to a Western world that largely views Pakistan as a fount of Islamist terrorism, a potential nuclear threat and an impoverished, military-ruled desert in the sullen shadow of shining, democratic India. In pursuit of international absolution, Musharraf -- who seized power in 1999 -- devotes many pages to his vision of a modern Pakistan, his values as a soldier, his disillusionment with corrupt civilian leaders, his efforts to seek peace with India and his contributions to the war on terrorism.
Last month, he launched an extraordinary pre-publication charm offensive in New York and Washington. The bespectacled general bantered easily with Jon Stewart on The Daily Show and earned an impromptu sales boost from President Bush after a joint White House press conference. ("Buy the book," a smiling Bush told reporters.) But before it hit the stores, In the Line of Fire had been dissected by a wide array of critics. In the United States, Musharraf kicked up a storm by accusing a former deputy secretary of state, Richard L. Armitage, of threatening to bomb Pakistan "back to the Stone Age" in the wake of 9/11 if it chose al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts over the United States. (Armitage has acknowledged the stark tenor of his message but flatly denied making such a military threat.) In India, outraged critics focused on Musharraf's description of a summit with India, where he charges that its then-prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, backed out of an agreement over the disputed territory of Kashmir because mysterious higher powers had overruled and "humiliated" Vajpayee.
But the worst vitriol came from Pakistan itself, where some critics trashed the book as a self-serving rewrite of history that betrays the nation's interest. For example, Musharraf goes to great lengths to prove that Pakistan's 1999 invasion of the mountainous Kargil district of Kashmir, a political and military disaster, was a triumph that will someday be "written in golden letters." Others expressed outrage at Musharraf's excoriation of A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani scientist who is believed to have sold nuclear know-how to pariah regimes such as Iran, North Korea and Libya but who remains a hero to many Pakistanis. Musharraf, under heat from Washington over Khan's activities, portrays him here as a greedy rogue who somehow managed to hide all his evil deeds from the government.
Many of the negative notices ring true. Alternately coy and candid, Musharraf glosses airily over unanswered questions, denies widespread reports that leaders of Afghanistan's Taliban movement are operating inside Pakistan and portrays himself as staunchly opposed to Islamic fundamentalism, even though he has backed off on many reforms in deference to radical clerics. Even when expressing noble sentiments, Musharraf can undercut his message with clumsy insults and undiplomatic observations that might have been better left unsaid. (After all, how do you edit a dictator?)
But despite its limits as a window into history, In the Line of Fire offers valuable insights -- sometimes intentionally, sometimes not -- about an important U.S. partner in the war on terrorism whose powerful, secretive military-intelligence apparatus was once the Taliban's chief patron.
At some points, the story is gripping simply because the author was at the center of it. Much has been written about the coup that brought Gen. Musharraf to power after then-president Nawaz Sharif tried to fire him while he was on a commercial plane heading home from a foreign trip.
Now, we are finally in the cockpit of the fuming general's plane as his pilot is ordered not to land -- even though the craft has only moments of fuel left.
The most compelling episodes are the operations launched to hunt down al-Qaeda operatives and suicide bombers, especially after two attempts on Musharraf's life in 2003. The dutiful reader is snapped to attention by dramatic chases that read like a thriller, full of fascinating details that only an insider would know -- and perhaps outsiders should not. For instance, Musharraf reveals that, during various operations, Pakistani agents have found a piece of shirt collar from a suicide bomber and traced it to his hometown tailor, used an elaborate system to track cell phone use among suspects, and covered themselves in burqas to shadow and snatch a major al-Qaeda figure.
In Musharraf's zeal to prove his counterterrorist bona fides, he exaggerates the importance of some captives and gloats over successful missions, clearly enjoying the experience of calling Bush in May 2005 to say Pakistan has captured an al-Qaeda leader, Abu Faraj al-Libbi. (Musharraf then undiplomatically calls Libbi "the one al Qaeda operative whose name Bush knew, apart from Osama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.")
The book also airs some military dirty laundry that may infuriate Musharraf's own institutions. The general acknowledges hurt and bewilderment at being passed over for promotions early in his career, much as he confesses to schoolboy pranks and slights of a half-century ago after his family fled India during the chaotic partition that created Pakistan in 1947.
In his writing, as in many of his public comments, Musharraf can prove both his own best salesman and his own worst enemy. Still, this memoir tells us a great deal about a military Muslim leader we need to understand -- and about a country to which we should have been paying much more attention.
download the complete book.
Pamela Constable, a deputy foreign editor at The Washington Post, reports frequently from Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In the Line of Fire, Musharraf's English-language memoir, is an equally contradictory effort to explain himself to a Western world that largely views Pakistan as a fount of Islamist terrorism, a potential nuclear threat and an impoverished, military-ruled desert in the sullen shadow of shining, democratic India. In pursuit of international absolution, Musharraf -- who seized power in 1999 -- devotes many pages to his vision of a modern Pakistan, his values as a soldier, his disillusionment with corrupt civilian leaders, his efforts to seek peace with India and his contributions to the war on terrorism.
Last month, he launched an extraordinary pre-publication charm offensive in New York and Washington. The bespectacled general bantered easily with Jon Stewart on The Daily Show and earned an impromptu sales boost from President Bush after a joint White House press conference. ("Buy the book," a smiling Bush told reporters.) But before it hit the stores, In the Line of Fire had been dissected by a wide array of critics. In the United States, Musharraf kicked up a storm by accusing a former deputy secretary of state, Richard L. Armitage, of threatening to bomb Pakistan "back to the Stone Age" in the wake of 9/11 if it chose al-Qaeda and its Taliban hosts over the United States. (Armitage has acknowledged the stark tenor of his message but flatly denied making such a military threat.) In India, outraged critics focused on Musharraf's description of a summit with India, where he charges that its then-prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, backed out of an agreement over the disputed territory of Kashmir because mysterious higher powers had overruled and "humiliated" Vajpayee.
But the worst vitriol came from Pakistan itself, where some critics trashed the book as a self-serving rewrite of history that betrays the nation's interest. For example, Musharraf goes to great lengths to prove that Pakistan's 1999 invasion of the mountainous Kargil district of Kashmir, a political and military disaster, was a triumph that will someday be "written in golden letters." Others expressed outrage at Musharraf's excoriation of A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani scientist who is believed to have sold nuclear know-how to pariah regimes such as Iran, North Korea and Libya but who remains a hero to many Pakistanis. Musharraf, under heat from Washington over Khan's activities, portrays him here as a greedy rogue who somehow managed to hide all his evil deeds from the government.
Many of the negative notices ring true. Alternately coy and candid, Musharraf glosses airily over unanswered questions, denies widespread reports that leaders of Afghanistan's Taliban movement are operating inside Pakistan and portrays himself as staunchly opposed to Islamic fundamentalism, even though he has backed off on many reforms in deference to radical clerics. Even when expressing noble sentiments, Musharraf can undercut his message with clumsy insults and undiplomatic observations that might have been better left unsaid. (After all, how do you edit a dictator?)
But despite its limits as a window into history, In the Line of Fire offers valuable insights -- sometimes intentionally, sometimes not -- about an important U.S. partner in the war on terrorism whose powerful, secretive military-intelligence apparatus was once the Taliban's chief patron.
At some points, the story is gripping simply because the author was at the center of it. Much has been written about the coup that brought Gen. Musharraf to power after then-president Nawaz Sharif tried to fire him while he was on a commercial plane heading home from a foreign trip.
Now, we are finally in the cockpit of the fuming general's plane as his pilot is ordered not to land -- even though the craft has only moments of fuel left.
The most compelling episodes are the operations launched to hunt down al-Qaeda operatives and suicide bombers, especially after two attempts on Musharraf's life in 2003. The dutiful reader is snapped to attention by dramatic chases that read like a thriller, full of fascinating details that only an insider would know -- and perhaps outsiders should not. For instance, Musharraf reveals that, during various operations, Pakistani agents have found a piece of shirt collar from a suicide bomber and traced it to his hometown tailor, used an elaborate system to track cell phone use among suspects, and covered themselves in burqas to shadow and snatch a major al-Qaeda figure.
In Musharraf's zeal to prove his counterterrorist bona fides, he exaggerates the importance of some captives and gloats over successful missions, clearly enjoying the experience of calling Bush in May 2005 to say Pakistan has captured an al-Qaeda leader, Abu Faraj al-Libbi. (Musharraf then undiplomatically calls Libbi "the one al Qaeda operative whose name Bush knew, apart from Osama bin Laden and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.")
The book also airs some military dirty laundry that may infuriate Musharraf's own institutions. The general acknowledges hurt and bewilderment at being passed over for promotions early in his career, much as he confesses to schoolboy pranks and slights of a half-century ago after his family fled India during the chaotic partition that created Pakistan in 1947.
In his writing, as in many of his public comments, Musharraf can prove both his own best salesman and his own worst enemy. Still, this memoir tells us a great deal about a military Muslim leader we need to understand -- and about a country to which we should have been paying much more attention.
download the complete book.
Pamela Constable, a deputy foreign editor at The Washington Post, reports frequently from Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Saturday, October 10, 2009
The Reluctant Fundamentalist (Mohsin Hamid)
Book Review
Reluctant Fundamentalist is perhaps the best account in fiction, so far, that attempts to portray the complex and confused relationship between the West and Islam after the tragic events of 9/11. Nothing more wonderful, nothing more accurate, perhaps nothing more fine in fiction has ever been written on the topic so far. The narration is almost like a monologue but pretty much different from the stream of consciousness technique adopted by the modernist writers of the early twentieth century. Despite the visible difference in narrative techniques, one cannot help but detect traces of Faulkner and Fitzgerald. Here, Mohsin much like them attempts to depict the disillusionment of a society going through turbulent and complex age. What sets the novel apart is its fascinating narrator who converses with an indifferent and suspicious American at a cafe table in Lahore.The American throughout the novel remains a passive listener but gives his powerful feedback through his uneasy body language.
Changez, a youth educated at Princeton, begins his horrible tale of suffering in the US. The start of his education at Princeton marks the beginning of his American dream. Things look wonderful; everything looks in place but all the things change with the horrific events of 9/11. Suddenly, hate and abhorrence starts to come aplenty. 9/11 brings to life a dormant volcano, which explodes with such a powerful eruption that no place is safe from its volcanic bombs and searing lava. In this deteriorating situation, Changez finds himself alone in the middle of nowhere with bombs falling on his uncovered head.
Even years before 9/11, Changez could smell the winds that precede a storm and he is rather forced to wear a mask. That is when he discovers that he is a civilizational other. His mask attempts to erase that consciousness of being an alien.
With the passage of time, Changez finds it difficult to blend in with the western culture. His trips to the colourful beaches and all his efforts to blend himself just fade away into insignificance when compared with the new wave of hatred that comes from 9/11. His assignment at the Underwood Samson temporarily promises him a firm and strong position in an otherwise hostile society.
His beloved Erica, despite all her efforts fails to free her mind from the ghost of Christ, a former boyfriend, now dead. Her relationship with Changez remains troubled by Chris. Although Chris is dead, he remains an integral part of Erica’s consciousness. Chris is almost a symbol of American spirit that always stands in the way of Erica and Changez. His ghost denies them a fruitful bond. All the efforts on part of Changez fail to win her, so much so that when a moment of physical consummation comes, he feels blood. Instead of Erica’s body he smells blood. With time, Erica Looses her health and with this she loses her sanity as well. Later she disappears.
But that is not the end of Changez’s misery. 9/11 comes as a frightening point in his life. It comes as a monster that hurls his life into a horrible hurricane. This is the point where his relationship with Erica starts to deteriorate. People around him start to doubt him. Slowly, he begins to realize that all Muslims especially Pakistanis are being seen as potential terrorists. He loses his interest in work and rather begins to search for his identity. Around that time he is sent on an assignment to Chile, where he converses with a publisher who equates Changez with a Janissary1 (Christian youth conscripted by the Ottomans forced to fight their very own civilization). Neruda, the publisher compares Changez to a Janissary which comes as shock and a revelation. That is where Changez realizes the futility of his infatuation with the American dream, his longing for the western life, his appreciation of all that was American. He realizes that he was not even a cog in the machine but much more inferior to that.
While Changez is narrating this story to the unnamed American, there is an air of hostility that prevails between the narrator and the listener. Changez’s constant efforts to take the American into confidence fails. The unidentified American seems pretty much an undercover assassin on a mission to kill Changez. Perhaps, Changez’s elevated level of awareness from his American experience is allowing him to instil that consciousness into the minds of Pakistanis at large, something the American is very suspicious about.
Changez who is now a Frankenstein monster has become an anathema for the Americans. So despite repeated assurances, the Amercian remains uneasy and continues to doubt him as he listens to his story.
Meanwhile, Changez is being seen as a potential terrorist back in America. People tend to look him with scorn. The moment comes when bystanders cast unfamiliar glances at Changez. That is the moment when one of them approaches Changez in an attempt to beat him. However the collision is averted nevertheless Changez picks up a shaft and at the moment feels “fully capable of wielding it with sufficient violence to shatter the bones of his skull”. In the meanwhile, he hears of Erica’s fate. The nurse at the institution informs Changez of Erica’s strange disappearance. Perhaps, she committed suicide. With all this, Changez feels a severe longing for home. But that too is shattered by the horrific events revolving around Indo-Pak increasing hostilities.
As Changez’s story comes to its end, he accompanies the American to the Pearl Continental hotel. Despite Changez’s repeated efforts to assure the American that he is not a terrorist, that he is a peace loving citizen; the American thinks of him to be a potential terrorist. Changez entertains him with all delicious meals but fails to earn any applause. Somewhere around midnight, as the American is about to enter the hotel, and as the darkness of the night increases his paranoia, he reaches into his pocket perhaps for the handgun, perhaps for something else. Hamid leaves that for the reader to decide.
Janisar Ahmed
Reluctant Fundamentalist is perhaps the best account in fiction, so far, that attempts to portray the complex and confused relationship between the West and Islam after the tragic events of 9/11. Nothing more wonderful, nothing more accurate, perhaps nothing more fine in fiction has ever been written on the topic so far. The narration is almost like a monologue but pretty much different from the stream of consciousness technique adopted by the modernist writers of the early twentieth century. Despite the visible difference in narrative techniques, one cannot help but detect traces of Faulkner and Fitzgerald. Here, Mohsin much like them attempts to depict the disillusionment of a society going through turbulent and complex age. What sets the novel apart is its fascinating narrator who converses with an indifferent and suspicious American at a cafe table in Lahore.The American throughout the novel remains a passive listener but gives his powerful feedback through his uneasy body language.
Changez, a youth educated at Princeton, begins his horrible tale of suffering in the US. The start of his education at Princeton marks the beginning of his American dream. Things look wonderful; everything looks in place but all the things change with the horrific events of 9/11. Suddenly, hate and abhorrence starts to come aplenty. 9/11 brings to life a dormant volcano, which explodes with such a powerful eruption that no place is safe from its volcanic bombs and searing lava. In this deteriorating situation, Changez finds himself alone in the middle of nowhere with bombs falling on his uncovered head.
Even years before 9/11, Changez could smell the winds that precede a storm and he is rather forced to wear a mask. That is when he discovers that he is a civilizational other. His mask attempts to erase that consciousness of being an alien.
With the passage of time, Changez finds it difficult to blend in with the western culture. His trips to the colourful beaches and all his efforts to blend himself just fade away into insignificance when compared with the new wave of hatred that comes from 9/11. His assignment at the Underwood Samson temporarily promises him a firm and strong position in an otherwise hostile society.
His beloved Erica, despite all her efforts fails to free her mind from the ghost of Christ, a former boyfriend, now dead. Her relationship with Changez remains troubled by Chris. Although Chris is dead, he remains an integral part of Erica’s consciousness. Chris is almost a symbol of American spirit that always stands in the way of Erica and Changez. His ghost denies them a fruitful bond. All the efforts on part of Changez fail to win her, so much so that when a moment of physical consummation comes, he feels blood. Instead of Erica’s body he smells blood. With time, Erica Looses her health and with this she loses her sanity as well. Later she disappears.
But that is not the end of Changez’s misery. 9/11 comes as a frightening point in his life. It comes as a monster that hurls his life into a horrible hurricane. This is the point where his relationship with Erica starts to deteriorate. People around him start to doubt him. Slowly, he begins to realize that all Muslims especially Pakistanis are being seen as potential terrorists. He loses his interest in work and rather begins to search for his identity. Around that time he is sent on an assignment to Chile, where he converses with a publisher who equates Changez with a Janissary1 (Christian youth conscripted by the Ottomans forced to fight their very own civilization). Neruda, the publisher compares Changez to a Janissary which comes as shock and a revelation. That is where Changez realizes the futility of his infatuation with the American dream, his longing for the western life, his appreciation of all that was American. He realizes that he was not even a cog in the machine but much more inferior to that.
While Changez is narrating this story to the unnamed American, there is an air of hostility that prevails between the narrator and the listener. Changez’s constant efforts to take the American into confidence fails. The unidentified American seems pretty much an undercover assassin on a mission to kill Changez. Perhaps, Changez’s elevated level of awareness from his American experience is allowing him to instil that consciousness into the minds of Pakistanis at large, something the American is very suspicious about.
Changez who is now a Frankenstein monster has become an anathema for the Americans. So despite repeated assurances, the Amercian remains uneasy and continues to doubt him as he listens to his story.
Meanwhile, Changez is being seen as a potential terrorist back in America. People tend to look him with scorn. The moment comes when bystanders cast unfamiliar glances at Changez. That is the moment when one of them approaches Changez in an attempt to beat him. However the collision is averted nevertheless Changez picks up a shaft and at the moment feels “fully capable of wielding it with sufficient violence to shatter the bones of his skull”. In the meanwhile, he hears of Erica’s fate. The nurse at the institution informs Changez of Erica’s strange disappearance. Perhaps, she committed suicide. With all this, Changez feels a severe longing for home. But that too is shattered by the horrific events revolving around Indo-Pak increasing hostilities.
As Changez’s story comes to its end, he accompanies the American to the Pearl Continental hotel. Despite Changez’s repeated efforts to assure the American that he is not a terrorist, that he is a peace loving citizen; the American thinks of him to be a potential terrorist. Changez entertains him with all delicious meals but fails to earn any applause. Somewhere around midnight, as the American is about to enter the hotel, and as the darkness of the night increases his paranoia, he reaches into his pocket perhaps for the handgun, perhaps for something else. Hamid leaves that for the reader to decide.
Janisar Ahmed
Sunday, October 4, 2009
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